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This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment when
a market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech product
market). It is assumed that a ﬁrm facing such market evolution is always unsure about
whether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about the
probability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phase
arrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in ﬂuctuating markets suﬃces for an
option value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretation
of the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. The
paper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has a
continuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the sample
path of the ﬁrm’s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,
irrespective of whether the ﬁrm is active or not.
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Numerous products such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, or more generally high-tech goods,
are characterized by a temporal evolution of demand that alternates between periods of
growth and decline at random times. An additional feature of high-tech products is that
they eventually disappear, replaced by superior substitutes,1 although it is actually rather
hard to predict whether the introduction of an innovation will lead to a permanent decay
in the demand for an established product. The case of ﬂoppy disk drives for computers is
especially illuminating in this respect. Such drives dominated the market from the mid-
eighties to the late nineties, and they successfully survived the challenge posed by several
innovations such as zip drives (and a few others less known), which, despite a promising
start, simply led to a transitory decline in demand for ﬂoppy drives. The irreversible decline
in the demand for ﬂoppy drives had to await until the arrival of USB and CD-ROM/DVD-
ROM drives, whose introduction led to the end of a reign of around ﬁfteen years.2 This
example suggests that when the decline phase of a high-tech industry starts, established
ﬁrms (or potential entrants) are unsure about whether a sharp decline in demand is going to
be temporary or permanent. However, a ﬁrm can use the length of such a phase as a signal
to update its beliefs about the probability that the downturn in demand is permanent. In
this sense, the longer a decline phase, the less likely that a ﬁrm perceives the demand decline
as a transitory shock.
Investment decisions in high-tech industries must certainly account for such stochastically
cyclical evolution of important variables such as market demand (or proﬁt), especially when
t h ed e g r e eo fs p e c i ﬁcity of assets in which to invest is high. For these industries, the dynamics
of the underlying state variable can be better represented by means of a regime-switching
stochastic process rather than the standard diﬀusion process traditionally employed by the
real options literature.3 For instance, there is no way to explicitly model growth and decline
phases–i.e., the regimes of the process–using a single Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM).
Recently, a few papers such as Driﬁll, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) or Guo, Miao and Morellec
(2005) have addressed this issue by introducing models of investment behavior in which the
market regime switches at random dates. In particular, these papers propose a perpetual
1See Adner and Zemsky (2005) for a discussion and a formalization of how gradual competition by
"disruptive technologies" can sometimes displace established technologies, leading to their abandoning (or
f o r c i n gt h e mt os e r v ear e s i d u a lm a r k e tn i c h e ) .
2As pointed out by McAfee (2002, p. 102), it is worth remarking that "often the decline of one industry
is caused by the growth of another, closely related industry."
3Two classic papers on real options theory are McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit (1989). Pindyck
(1991) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide excellent surveys of some of the most relevant theoretical devel-
opments. See also the recent work by Riedel and Su (2007) for an elegant general approach to irreversible
investment under uncertainty.
1evolution of the market demand such that it alternates between growth and decline phases
at uncertain times. These models are especially well suited for analyzing (dis)investment
decisions in industries that are highly sensitive to business cycle movements. Yet, they do
not capture several properties that characterize the temporal evolution of demand in high-
tech industries, in which perpetual alternation of regimes generally does not take place due
to the very own nature of such industries. At some point, demand for high-tech products
starts an irreversible decline, even if it is reasonable to suppose that such decline is diﬃcult
to forecast, as illustrated by the unexpectedly long life of ﬂoppy disk drives.
In this paper, we introduce a piecewise deterministic process in continuous time in which
the regime switches at random dates, but only a random number of times.O u r a i m i s
to provide a stylized model for a high-tech industry whose proﬁt/demand follows a random
number of random-length cycles (where each cycle is characterized by a growth and a decline
phase). In addition to this dual source of uncertainty, economic agents face a simple ﬁltering
problem in that they cannot observe the realized number of regime shifts, that is, agents
a r ea l w a y su n s u r ea b o u tw h e t h e rt h ed e c l i n ep h a s eo ft h ec u r r e n tc y c l ei sp e r m a n e n to rn o t .
However, once a decline phase starts, a ﬁrm can revise its beliefs about the probability that
the market decays forever as no growth phase arrives. Our main purpose is to understand
general properties of this type of regime-switching models of market evolution, as well as
study their implications for (dis)investment decisions in high-tech industries. For this reason,
we ﬁrst characterize some properties of the stochastic process that we introduce, and then
apply them to the analysis and characterization of a single agent’s optimal entry and exit
behavior.
A novel contribution of this paper is to show that, in ﬂuctuating market environments, the
possibility of regime switching suﬃces for an option value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise.4
Because the length of growth and decline phases is random, a ﬁrm has an incentive to wait
and continuously update its information about the duration of the current phase without
making any irreversible decision, and at the same time it can capitalize on favorable market
evolutions.5 The existence of an option value of delaying (dis)investment in regime-switching
4Our notion of ﬂuctuating market evolution refers to the idea that markets grow and decline over time.
However, even if the market is assumed to remain stable at a certain level, a continuously changing state
variable can arise by allowing a ﬁrm to improve its payoﬀ if it discovers a certain state of the world. If the
realized state can be discovered only by exerting an a priori unknown amount of investment eﬀort, then
beliefs continuously change over time as an agent invests, and there can be an option value of investing
in (time-consuming) experimentation even if the market remains at the same level. Recent pieces of work
building on this idea are the game-theoretic papers by Décamps and Mariotti (2004) or Keller, Rady and
Cripps (2005), or the paper on entrepreneurship by Miao and Wang (2006). See Lucas (1971) for a pioneering
analysis.
5In the case of a declining market, the ﬁrm also incorporates the change in its assessment about the
transitory character of the current decline phase into its information updating, which aﬀects option values,
2models of ﬂuctuating market evolution has relevant conceptual implications for the theory of
real options. This theory lacks a marginal interpretation of optimal (dis)investment policies,
which probably explains to a large extent why both scholars and practitioners ﬁnd it hardly
intuitive. Another major contribution of this paper is to provide a marginal interpretation
that is linked to the "bad news principle of irreversible investment" spelled out by Bernanke
(1983), which in our view is the conceptual pillar of real options theory.6 According to
this principle, a ﬁrm that slightly delays investment when there is fully ongoing uncertainty
should only care about the arrival of bad news and their adverse eﬀect on payoﬀs.7
In the light of the "bad news principle," the optimal entry policy lends itself to the
following marginal interpretation. On the one hand, slightly delaying entry into a growing
market that will stop expanding after some random time is marginally valuable for two
reasons. First, the ﬁrm can save part of its investment cost. Second, there is a marginal
option value of waiting to invest because the ﬁrm avoids making a wrong entry decision with
some probability. In particular, a slight delay allows the ﬁrm to avoid the adverse eﬀect of
a sudden regime shift –this is the "bad news"–, something which happens with positive
probability. As a result, the marginal option value of waiting to invest is measured by the
expected loss in the project’s NPV that is avoided by waiting. On the other hand, delaying
investment is costly for a ﬁrm in that it entails forgoing a proﬁt ﬂow,8 so optimal entry
behavior must balance the marginal cost and the marginal beneﬁt of deferring investment.
The marginal interpretation of the optimal exit policy in a declining market that may stop
declining after some random time is similar in spirit.9 On the one hand, a slight delay in exit
is (marginally) costly because the ﬁrm forgoes earning interest on the asset’s outside value.
On the other hand, there are two reasons why delaying exit is valuable. First, remaining
a little bit longer in the market allows the ﬁrm to extend the period of proﬁt harvesting.
Second, deferring exit is also valuable because there is a marginal option value of waiting
to disinvest, which again arises due to the possible arrival of bad news –and the start of a
growth phase is bad news for an exit decision in a declining market. With some probability,
but does not dissipate them.
6Actually, a marginal interpretation of investment policies can be found in the inﬂuential paper by Abel
and Eberly (1996). However, their interpretation is linked to the Jorgensonian user cost of capital rather
than Bernanke’s (1983) "bad news principle of irreversible investment."
7The point is that an irreversible decision is costly in that it can be regretted ex post, which can happen
only if bad news have arrived. As a direct consequence, a ﬁrm should consider only the eﬀect of the arrival
of bad news (and not good news) when contemplating a delay in the execution of an irreversible decision.
8In some sense, waiting to invest amounts to exercising an option to learn about future market conditions
without making any irreversible decision. The cost of exercising such an option is the proﬁt ﬂow forgone by
delaying investment.
9It is worth pointing out that the paper shows that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to exit only if the market is
declining. Similarly, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to enter only if the market is growing.
3the regime may shift and the market may start growing, so waiting allows the ﬁrm to avoid
making a poor exit decision in such a case, since remaining active in a growing market while
keeping the option to exit alive can be shown to be more valuable than seizing the outside
option.10 It is important to note that the marginal option value of waiting to disinvest
arises in a market environment subject to ﬂuctuations because the regime shifts at random
dates. In particular, it does not arise because the regime switches just a random number
of times. In fact, based on the insights provided by the "bad news principle," it holds that
the randomness in the number of regime switches aﬀects only the probability of arrival of
bad news,11 and hence creates an incentive to exit at higher demand/proﬁt levels because it
lowers the marginal option value of waiting to disinvest. In turn, the unobservability of the
realized number of regime shifts aﬀects only the probability of regime shift that is perceived
by the ﬁrm based on the length of time elapsed since the market last switched. Because the
ﬁrm becomes pessimistic about the arrival of bad news as no growth phase starts, another
application of the "bad news principle" yields that the level of demand/proﬁta tw h i c ht h e
ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to disinvest is higher the earlier the decline phase started.
Another contribution of this paper is to draw implications for ﬁrm valuation of regime-
switching models of market evolution. By construction, the stochastic process that we ex-
amine has a continuous sample path despite its discrete number of regimes.12 However, we
show that the sample path of the value of a (dis)investment opportunity experiences jumps
whenever the regime switches all of a sudden. In particular, ﬁrm value jumps upwards (down-
wards) whenever a growth (decline) phase starts, so imperceptible changes in the proﬁt ﬂow
collected by the ﬁr mm a yb ea c c o m p a n i e db ys i g n i ﬁcant falls or rises in ﬁrm value due to the
discreteness of the regime shifts.13 Such prediction is in stark contrast to that of conventional
real options models, which do not predict jumps in the value of a ﬁrm, whether active or
not, when the stochastic process of the underlying variable has a continuous sample path. In
addition, our paper gives a rationale for using jump processes in the valuation of high-tech
ﬁrms’ stock prices based on a regime-switching stochastic process for the underlying state
variable.
Our paper contributes to the recent real options literature based on regime-switching
10Of course, it need not be true for other (suboptimal) exit policies that seizing the outside option is less
valuable than remaining active in a growing market while keeping the option to exit alive.
11R e c a l lt h a tt h es t a r to fag r o w t hp h a s ec o n s t i t u t e sb a dn e w sf o ra ne x i td e c i s i o ni nam a r k e tt h a ti s
declining.
12More precisely, because regime shifts only refer to the instantaneous growth rate of the ﬂow proﬁts,
which preserves the continuity of the process that governs proﬁte v o l u t i o n .
13It is worth pointing out that the assumption that the market may not go through more cycles in the
future with some probability, and the unobservability of this event, do not cause the jumps. Yet, they do
aﬀect their size (and the rate at which ﬁrm value decreases during a decline phase).
4models. The work by Driﬁll, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) numerically analyzes how the value
of a single investment opportunity is aﬀected by the existence of an inﬁnite number of regime
shifts. In a similar market environment, Guo, Miao and Morellec (2005) examine a ﬁrm’s
capital accumulation process and ﬁnd the remarkable result that regime shifts may explain
why investment in divisible capital can be intermittent and lumpy even if ﬁxed adjustment
costs are negligible.
The current paper diﬀers from these papers in several respects. From a technical stand-
point, these regime-switching models of investment have not paid attention to those situa-
tions in which the regime switches a random number of times, let alone to those in which
the realized number of regime shifts is unobservable. As a result, their models are more
adequate for markets whose evolution is highly correlated with that of the business cycle,14
whereas our framework is intended to model high-tech industries subject to market-speciﬁc
ﬂuctuations. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst in characterizing
some general properties of a regime-switching stochastic process such as the (conditionally)
expected stream of discounted proﬁts harvested while the process transitions from one state
to another. From a conceptual standpoint, our paper diﬀers in that we show that the ex-
istence of regime shifts in a ﬂuctuating market is suﬃcient to give rise to an option value
of waiting to (dis)invest.15 Furthermore, we strengthen the conceptual foundations of real
options theory by providing a marginal interpretation linked to Bernanke’s (1983) "bad news
principle" for both entry and exit policies, even in the complicated case in which the ﬁrm
cannot observe whether the current cycle is going to be the last one. Lastly, from a predictive
point of view, we show that the discreteness in regime changes leads to a discontinuous sam-
ple path for ﬁrm value although the sample path of the stochastic process for instantaneous
proﬁt is continuous. Not only do we show that the sample path is discontinuous, but also
show that it jumps up (down) when a decline phase stops (starts), irrespective of whether
the ﬁrm has an option to invest or disinvest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stochastic
14Some representative industries that are sensitive to macroeconomic conditions are those producing
durable goods such as motor vehicles or electrical appliances (see Berman and Pﬂeeger 1997 for many
more examples). It is worth noting that our main results apply to this type of industries as well (since
it corresponds to the speciﬁc case in which the market reaches an irreversible market decline with zero
probability).
15To be precise, the papers by Driﬁll, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) and Guo, Miao and Morellec (2005)
model the temporal evolution of demand by means of a GBM together with a (discrete) switching of the
drift and volatility parameters of such process at random dates. Apart from assuming a random number
of regime shifts whose realization is unobservable to the decision-maker, we diﬀer from these two papers
in that we set the volatility parameters of their process equal to zero. Doing so allows us to show in a
transparent manner that switches in the drift of their diﬀusion process are suﬃcient to create an option
value of waiting to (dis)invest, which unveils relevant implications of regime switching models of investment
that were previously hidden by the GBM assumption.
5process that constitutes the starting point of our analysis. Given the novelty of the process,
Section 3 provides several mathematical results such as expected discount factors on the
state space and present value calculations, which makes some of the results in subsequent
sections quite straightforward. Section 4 and 5 respectively characterize the optimal entry
and exit policies, relate them to the "bad news principle," and analyze their implications for
ﬁrm valuation. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of the results can be found in two appendices.
2 The model
In this section we construct a stochastic process with continuous sample paths that represents
the random evolution of a certain variable Π. For the sake of concreteness, Π(t) denotes
instantaneous proﬁta tt i m et, although it could certainly represent any other variable such
as demand or price of a product.
Let the dynamics of ﬂow proﬁts be such that dΠ = α(t)Πdt,w h e r e{α(t),t ≥ 0} is a
M a r k o vc h a i nw i t hs t a t e s{α1,α 2} ∈ <++×< −−. It is assumed for convenience that the
chain starts at state α1 (i.e., α(0) = α1), while the transition probabilities of this process are
as follows. On the one hand, if the chain is in state α1 at time t ≥ 0, then the probability that
it moves to state α2 between times t and t+dt is Pr(α(t+dt)=α2|α(t)=α1)=λ1dt+o(dt).
On the other hand, if the chain is in state α2 at time t>0, then the probability that it moves
to state α1 between times t and t+dt is Pr(α(t+dt)=α1 |α(t)=α2)=e Λλ2dt+o(dt),w h e r e
e Λ is a Bernoulli random variable that is independently drawn every time the chain leaves
state α1.I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tΛ =1with probability p0 ∈ [0,1] and Λ =0with probability
1 − p0.16 It is also assumed that every draw is unobservable as long as the chain does not
leave state α2.17
Letting e τi denote the inter-arrival time of event i ∈ {1,2,...} (where an event is a change
in the state of the chain), we have that {e τi}
∞
i=1 is a sequence of exponential random variables
such that the inter-arrival times with odd (even) subscripts are exponentially distributed
with rate λ1 > 0( λ2 > 0).18 We deﬁne Ti = Ti−1 + τi,f o ra l li ∈ {1,2,...}, where the initial
date is T0 =0 ,a n dw er e f e rt oe a c hTi as a (realized) switching date. Because of the i.i.d.
assumption on the Bernoulli random variable e Λ, only the ﬁrst 2e n − 1 elements of sequence
16When p0 =1 , this process is the continuous-time limit of the stochastic process put forward by Bagwell
and Staiger (1997) in their analysis of collusive behavior over the business cycle.
17Equivalently, we assume that state α1 is always transient, whereas state α2 can be either transient or
absorbing. In particular, such a state becomes absorbing once the chain has been e n times in state α1,w h e r e
e n is a geometrically distributed random variable with parameter 1−p0 whose draw is unobservable. (Hence,
Pr(e n = n)=( 1−p0)p
n−1
0 for n ∈ {1,2,...}.) If state α2 has not yet become absorbing and rather is transient,
then we assume that the transition probability is Pr(α(t + dt)=α1 |α(t)=α2)=λ2dt + o(dt).
18The rates λ1 and λ2 are allowed to be diﬀerent.
6{e τi}
∞
i=1 matter, where e n is a geometrically distributed random variable with parameter 1−p0.
As mentioned earlier, the draw of such probability distribution is never observed (although
it is perfectly learnt ex post if the chain leaves state α2,w h i c hc a nh a p p e no n l yi fΛ =1was
drawn when the process left state α1; otherwise, learning of the realization is imperfect).
Figure 1 shows two sample paths of the process we have described. As seen in the
ﬁgure, Π(t) grows exponentially at rate α1 > 0 during the random length period (Ti−1,T i)
(i =1 ,3,...), and decreases exponentially at rate α2 < 0 during (Ti−1,T i)(i =2 ,4,...),b u t
after some cycles it reaches a downturn that never ends. The sample path is assumed to
be continuous because limt↑Ti Π(t)=l i m t↓Ti Π(t), although the path will exhibit a kink at
any realized switching date Ti (i =1 ,2,...), and it will be almost everywhere diﬀerentiable.
Lastly, it holds that Π(t) > 0 for any t ≥ 0 and any set of realizations of the random
variables involved because we assume that Π(0) > 0.
Figure 1: Two sample paths
We say that the process (or, more fundamentally, market) is in a growth phase when it
is characterized by a positive instantaneous growth rate; otherwise, we say that the process
is in a decline phase. Because of the i.i.d. exponential random variables, the current state of
the market is clearly summarized by the current level of the ﬂow proﬁta n dt h ec u r r e n tt y p e
of phase through which the market is going. In addition, if the market is in a decline phase,
then there exists a simple signal extraction problem because the transition probability is
unknown. Given that e Λ is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable drawn every time the market
switches to decline, the level at which the last decline phase started (together with the
current level of the market) is another state variable, since such information is a suﬃcient
statistic for forming (posterior) beliefs about the probability that the current declining phase
7is not the last one.
This paper is concerned with (dis)investment decisions given the random temporal evo-
lution of a variable that determines the proﬁtability of a (dis)investment opportunity. Our
points can be conveyed more eﬃciently by focusing on a single decision-maker (as in Dixit
and Pindyck 1994), even if further applications may be based on more agents. In particular,
the paper studies a single ﬁrm’s decisions to enter and exit a market, each in isolation,19
given that the ﬂow of proﬁts made by the ﬁrm if active in the market follows the stochastic
process previously described. Speciﬁcally, at each date, the ﬁrm does not know when the
next upturns or downturns will happen, although it knows the current level of the proﬁt
ﬂow, whether the cycle is growing or declining and at what level the market started declin-
ing (if applicable). The ﬁrm also observes realized switching dates immediately once they
arrive. The ﬁrm is assumed to be risk-neutral and uses a constant discount rate r>0.I f
the ﬁrm enters the market, then it is assumed to incur a positive sunk cost K and in return
starts operating immediately (i.e., there is no time-to-build). Similarly, if the ﬁrm exits the
market, then it is assumed to recover a non-negative value S, which can be the salvage or
redeployment value of the asset.
3 Mathematical preliminaries
In this section we derive some relevant mathematical results regarding the stochastic process
deﬁned in Section 2. They are useful properties for working on the state space of the process
and they will be used in Sections 4 and 5. Throughout, we denote the current level of the
proﬁt ﬂow by π0,20 and relegate proofs to Appendix A.
We ﬁrst deal with the manner in which the ﬁrm updates its beliefs about the probability
that the current cycle is the last one. Clearly, when the market is growing, the ﬁrm does
not learn anything about whether the next decline phase is going to be the last one or
not. However, once the market has started declining, the ﬁrm does not know whether the
decline phase that has just begun is the last one, although it can revise its prior belief
about whether the current downturn is the last one or not by observing that no growth
phase arrives. Intuitively, the ﬁrm becomes more pessimistic as more time elapses without a
growth phase arriving. The following result based on Bayes’ rule corroborates this intuition,
but on the state space rather than the time space:
19One can study combined entry and exit as in Dixit (1989), but the results yield little insights additional
t ot h o s ew ed e r i v ei nt h i sp a p e r .
20We also use "upperbar" and "lowerbar" notation to respectively denote growth and decline phases. The
only exception is π, which is used to denote the state (i.e., level of the ﬂow proﬁt) at which the current
decline phase has started.
8Lemma 1 Suppose that the process is in a decline phase that started at level π and that the
current state is π0 ≤ π. Then the posterior probability that the decline phase is not going to






α2 +( 1− p0)
. Such posterior probability is increasing in
π0.
Figure 2 uses Lemma 1 to illustrate the sample path of the posterior belief that the
current cycle is the last one (denoted by P(t) a n dp l o t t e di nt h eb o t t o mg r a p h )t h a ti s
induced by a sample path of the stochastic process for proﬁts (see top graph). It can be
observed that the ﬁrm becomes pessimistic during a decline phase as long as no growth phase
arrives. Also, once the market starts an irreversible decline (which in this case happens in
the third cycle), the posterior belief that the decline phase is transitory converges to zero as
the period of time elapsed since the last switching date grows large.
Figure 2: Sample path of Π(t) and induced sample path of P(t) when α1 =0 .05 = −α2, λ1 =
λ2 =0 .1 and p0 =0 .6.
Our next result deals with the expected values of discounted streams of ﬂow proﬁts, but
before proceeding to computing them, it is useful to introduce some notation. In particular,
let
ρ1 ≡
(r − α2)(r + λ2 − α2)+λ1[r + λ2 (1 − p0) − α2]
(r − α2)[(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) − p0λ1λ2]
9and
ρ2(π0,π) ≡
(r − α2)(r + λ1 − α1)+λ2[r + λ1(1 − p0) − α1]+λ2 (α1 − α2)p(π0|π)
(r − α2)[(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) − p0λ1λ2]
,
and assume that
(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) >p 0λ1λ2 (1)
in order to have an economically meaningful setting (otherwise, streams of discounted proﬁts
fail to be integrable). A necessary condition for (1) to hold is that r + λ1 >α 1.
We now deal with the expected stream of discounted proﬁts if the ﬁrm is active in the
market forever given the current state π0.T o t h i s e n d , l e t E(π0,π∗) denote the expected
stream of discounted proﬁts while the process transitions from π0 until it ﬁrst hits π∗ ≤ π0
from above, given that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is π0.
Similarly, let E(π0,π∗ |π) denote the expected stream of discounted proﬁts while the process
transitions from π0 until it ﬁrst hits π∗ <π 0 from above, given that the process is in a decline
phase that started at level π a n dt h a tt h ec u r r e n ts t a t ei sπ0 ≤ π.L e t t i n g π∗ =0yields
that the expected stream of discounted proﬁts if the ﬁrm is active forever as a function of
the corresponding state variables takes the following form:
Theorem 1 Suppose that the ﬁrm is operating at π0 and is active forever. Then the expected
stream of discounted proﬁts is E(π0,0) = ρ1π0 if the process is in a growth phase, and
E(π0,0|π)=ρ2(π0,π)π0 if the process is in a decline phase that started at π and has not
stopped declining since then. Furthermore, E(π0,0) > E(π0,0|π) > 0.
In order to properly discount (one-shot) payoﬀs–such as investment costs or scrap
values–attained when the process reaches a certain state, it is also necessary to derive
the (conditionally) expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar at the ﬁr s td a t ea tw h i c h
the process hits a certain state from above or below.21 Such value is commonly referred to
as "the expected discount factor," and we stick to this terminology in the remainder of the
paper. Letting
∆ ≡ [α1 (λ2 + r) − α2 (λ1 + r)]
2 +4 p0α1α2λ1λ2 > 0,
we can derive the expected discount factor to be used when the dollar is achieved the ﬁrst
time the process reaches a certain state from below:
Theorem 2 (i) Suppose that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is
π0. Then the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits
21Expectations are conditional upon the current state being π0 a n du p o nw h e t h e rt h ep r o c e s si sg r o w i n g
or not. In the latter case, it is also conditional on the state π ≥ π0 at which the market started its decline.













(ii) Suppose that the process is in a decline phase that started at level π and that the
current state is π0 ≤ π. Then the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the
















Figure 3 provides a visual illustration of the problem. The process starts growing from
π0 and after several cycles ﬁrst hits π∗ from below at the (random) ﬁrst-passage time T∗.
Theorem 2 shows that the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar attained at the
random time T∗ is given by ϕ1(π0,π∗).
Figure 3: Expected discounted factor conditional upon the process growing at π0
Theorem 2 deals with expected discount factors that are useful when discounting one-shot
payoﬀs that are attained when the process ﬁrst hits a certain state from below. Discounting
of one-shot payoﬀs achieved when the process ﬁrst hits a certain level from above requires
some additional notation. In particular, letting
φ ≡
r(α1 − α2)
r(α1 − α2) − λ1α2 (1 − p0)
∈ (0,1),
11we have the parallel result to Theorem 2:
Theorem 3 (i) Suppose that the process is in a decline phase that started at level π and
t h a tt h ec u r r e n ts t a t ei sπ0 ≤ π. Then the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar


















(ii) Suppose that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is π0.T h e n
the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π∗ ≤ π0 from
above is
ϕ2 (π0,π









where δ1 ≡ 1 − φ +
(λ2 + r − α2β2)φ
λ2
∈ (0,1).
This problem is represented in Figure 4, which depicts a situation in which the process
starts declining at π and the current state is π0. It can be observed that, after several cycles,
the process ﬁrst hits π∗∗ from above at the (random) ﬁrst-passage time T∗∗.T h e o r e m 3
shows that the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar attained at time T∗∗ is given
by ϕ
2(π0,π ∗∗ |π).
Figure 4: Expected discounted factor conditional upon the process declining at π0 given that its
decline started at π
We can draw a useful corollary from the previous two theorems:
12Corollary 1 (i) Suppose that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is
π0. Then the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π0
from above is ϕ2 (π0,π 0)=δ1 ∈ (0,1).
(ii) Suppose that the process is in a decline phase that started at level π0 and that the
current state is π0. Then the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process
ﬁrst hits π0 from below is ϕ
1(π0,π0 |π0)=δ2 ∈ (0,1).
To conclude with our results in this section, notice that the expected stream of discounted
proﬁts derived in Theorem 1 is based on the hypothesis that an active ﬁrm never becomes
inactive, which is relevant for completely irreversible investment decisions. Sometimes, as
when the ﬁrm foresees exiting at some random time in the future, it is also necessary to
compute the (conditionally) expected stream of discounted proﬁts harvested until a certain
state is ﬁrst hit by the process. The following result deals with the expected discounted
proﬁt stream while transitioning from the current state to another one.
Theorem 4 (i) Suppose that the process is in a decline phase that started at level π and
that the current state is π0 ≤ π. Then the expected stream of discounted proﬁts while the



















(ii) Suppose that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is π0.T h e n
the expected stream of discounted proﬁts while the process transitions from π0 until it ﬁrst





















Figure 4 illustrates the situation faced by the ﬁrm when computing the expected stream
of discounted proﬁts while the process transitions from π0 until it ﬁrst hits π∗∗ ≤ π0 from
above, which happens at the ﬁrst-passage time T∗∗. The formula for computing such expected
payoﬀ is given by E(π0,π ∗∗ |π).
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 is a corollary from Theorem 4, since we have that
E(π0,π∗ |π)=E(π0,0|π) and E(π0,π∗)=E(π0,0) for π∗ =0 . This theorem is also useful
in drawing a simple but relevant result that will be used when dealing with disinvestment
decisions. Letting
















ρ2[λ2(1 − δ1)+r − α2] − 1
λ2
i nt h ec a s et h a tp0 =1 ,22 Theorem 4 leads to the following result:
Corollary 2 Suppose that the process is in a growth phase and that the current state is π0.
Then the expected stream of discounted proﬁts while the process transitions from π0 until it
ﬁrst hits π0 from above is E(π0,π0)=γ1π0.
4 Entry decision under uncertainty
The purpose of this section is to characterize the main properties of optimal investment
behavior and analyze its implications for ﬁrm valuation. For this reason, we assume that
the ﬁrm is not initially active in a stochastically cyclical market such as the one described
in Section 2. If the ﬁrm decides to undertake the investment and incur a sunk cost K>0,
then it is assumed to operate indeﬁnitely, i.e., the value of the outside option, S,e q u a l s
0. To shorten proofs, it is also assumed throughout this section that p0 =1 , although this
assumption has no impact on optimal investment behavior in the unrestricted case, since
the ﬁrm is never willing to enter a declining market when p0 =1(see Lemma 2 below). The
main implication is that the appeal of entering a declining market is even lower when p0 < 1,
since the ﬁrm becomes more and more pessimistic about the chances that the market starts
a n o t h e rg r o w t hp h a s ei nt h ef u t u r ea si tk e e p so nd e c l i n i n g . 23
The stochastic process of Section 2 is Markovian and homogeneous when p0 =1 ,s o
the ﬁrm’s optimal investment rule for each phase of a cycle is stationary. The ﬁrm’s entry
problem is even simpler because, as claimed earlier, investment does not take place while
the market is declining, except for corner solutions which are ruled out to make the analysis
nontrivial. This intuitive result is formally stated as follows:
Lemma 2 The ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy calls for no investment while the market is
declining.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To see why the lemma holds intuitively, suppose that the ﬁrm’s optimal entry rule called
for investment during a decline phase. Given that any proﬁt level that is reached in a
22Since in this case φ =1and ρ1 =
ρ2(r + λ2 − α2) − 1
λ2
.
23In other words, continuously learning bad news about the prospects of the market while it is declining
makes investment even less attractive than when the ﬁrm does not learn such bad news.
14declining phase must have been reached in a growth phase, it is clear that the ﬁrm could
have done better by investing at the same level in the growth phase. The reason is that, in
the worst-case scenario, the market would suddenly stop growing and start declining at such
level, so the ﬁrm should expect to gain more if the market were growing than if it invested
immediately in the downturn. This would entail a contradiction.
Therefore, Lemma 2 yields that it suﬃces to pay attention to phases in which the market
is in growth when solving for the ﬁrm’s optimal investment threshold. Thus, suppose that
the market is currently growing and denote the current state of the market by π0.T h eﬁrm
simply chooses a threshold πE such that it enters the market the ﬁr s tt i m et h ep r o c e s sh i t s
such threshold from below. Hence, the ﬁrm solves the following optimization problem:
max
πE
V E(πE|π0)=[ E(πE,0) − K]ϕ1(π0,πE)






where the last equality makes use of Theorems 1 and 2. Thus, the ﬁrm achieves an expected
net payoﬀ of E(πE,0) − K the ﬁrst time the market reaches level πE starting from state
π0. For this reason, ϕ1(π0,π E) is the expected discount factor that must be used when
discounting on the state space.












easy manipulations lead to the optimal investment threshold and the value of the investment
opportunity:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the market is growing and that the ﬁrm is currently inactive.














> 1.T h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm is
V
∗













if π0 ≤ π∗
E
ρ1π0 − K if π0 >π ∗
E
.
15The optimal investment threshold and the value of the option to invest conditional upon
the market being in a growth phase are very similar to those derived in a GBM-based setup
(c.f. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, pp. 142-143). Similarly, Proposition 1 implies that the ﬁrm




the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest.
A major contribution of this paper is to improve our conceptual understanding regarding
the optimality of a "wait-and-see" approach. In particular, unlike traditional real options
models based on Ito processes, the ﬁrm’s problem can be given the following marginal inter-
pretation:
Proposition 2 The optimal investment threshold π∗
E satisﬁes the following equation:
π
∗
E = rK + λ1[δ2(ρ1π
∗
E − K) − (ρ2π
∗
E − K)]. (3)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 states that the ﬁrm must equate the marginal cost and the marginal value
of waiting to invest.24 The left hand side of equation (3) is the proﬁt ﬂow forgone by
delaying entry a short period of time, π∗
Edt, while the right hand side of (3) quantiﬁes the
marginal value of waiting, which consists of two components. The ﬁrst part, rKdt,i st h e
part of the investment cost saved by waiting an inﬁnitesimal unit of time. The second
component, λ1dt[δ2(ρ1π∗
E − K) − (ρ2π∗
E − K)], is the marginal option value of waiting and
stems from Bernanke’s "bad news principle of irreversible investment."25 When the process
reaches π∗
E, waiting to invest allows the ﬁrm to avoid making a poor investment in case the
process switches to decline immediately. This happens with conditional probability λ1dt,
and would only bring an expected stream of discounted proﬁts of ρ2π∗
E −K = E (π∗
E,0)−K,







(accounting for the random-length period of time elapsed
until the proﬁt ﬂow grows back to the investment threshold, π∗
E).
To conclude with this section, it only remains to show that the value of an investment
opportunity experiences an upward (downward) jump when a decline phase stops (starts).
This is a relevant result that gives a rationale for using jump processes in the valuation
of stock even if the underlying state variable follows a continuous stochastic process. Note
that if the ﬁrm has not invested, whenever the market switches from growth to decline, the
24It is worth pointing out that the proposition is unchanged if p0 < 1.
25Such principle states that irreversibility yields no advantages but implies some costs because the ﬁrm
cannot recoup its investment if market conditions turn out to be adverse, which creates the asymmetry that
the ﬁrm cares only about adverse events –which would not be regrettable were investment reversible– but
not favorable ones.




E(π0),w h e r eV
∗
E(π0) denotes the ﬁrm’s
value when the market is declining at π0. Because the ﬁrm never invests while the market







the instantaneous proﬁt stays (roughly) at the same level, the ﬁrm’s value jumps down
(up) signiﬁcantly whenever the market suddenly stops growing (declining).27 This result is
formally stated as follows:






5 Exit decision under uncertainty
In this section, the ﬁrm is assumed to be already active in the market. Although in principle
it can operate in the market forever, its (indivisible) asset has a one-time opportunity cost
of S>0.M o r e o v e r ,t h eﬁrm cannot reenter in the future if it exits, i.e., K = ∞.
Our main purpose is to analyze and characterize disinvestment behavior in markets that
follow a random number of random-length cycles whenever the ﬁrm is always unsure about
whether the current cycle is the last one. However, the case in which there always exists
a positive prior probability that any decline phase will not be the last one is analytically
intractable (unless the probability p0 is equal to 1).28 Notwithstanding, one can get around




E(π0)/p0 (see Theorem 2), where V
∗
E(π0 |π)
denotes the value of the investment opportunity if the market is currently at state π0 given that it has started
declining at state π ≥ π0. Hence, jumps in ﬁrm value also take place in this case, since p(π0 |π)δ2/p0 < 1.
27It is worth remarking that this result holds even if the ﬁrm becomes active, since ρ1 >ρ 2(π0,π0) ≥
ρ2(π0,π).
28Essentially because it requires solving an unwieldy system of two non-linear partial diﬀerential equations.
To see this, let V
∗
(·) and V
∗(·) respectively denote the value of the disinvestment opportunity when the
market is growing and declining. Using dynamic programming, we have that the value function if the market
started declining at π and is currently at state π0 is
V
∗(π0,π)=m a x {S,π0dt +( 1− rdt)[p(π0 |π)λ2dtV
∗
(π0 + dπ)+( 1− p(π0 |π)λ2dt)V
∗(π0 + dπ,π)]},
whereas the value function when the market is growing at state π0 is
V
∗
(π0)=m a x {S,π0dt +( 1− rdt)[(1 − λ1dt)V
∗
(π0 + dπ)+λ1dtV
∗(π0 + dπ,π0 + dπ)]}.
Standard manipulations of this pair of Bellman equations in their waiting regions lead to the following system











(r + λ2p(π0 |π))V







17this drawback and draw several conclusions about the impact on disinvestment of a random
number of random-length cycles whenever the probability that a pre-speciﬁed cycle will be
the last one is equal to 1. That is, if the decline phase of cycle N (where N is a known
integer greater than 1) is the last one with probability 1–if it is ever reached–, but any
previous decline phase is the last one only with prior probability 1 − p0 ∈ (0,1),t h e ni ti s
possible to work backwards from the last cycle and show existence of a unique optimal exit
policy function for each cycle. In addition, it is also possible to characterize the properties
of such set of functions. The main concern with this approach, of course, has to do with
the distortionary eﬀect of the existence of a known last cycle, but such eﬀe c tv a n i s h e sf o r
large enough N, and hence has a negligible eﬀect on the exit policy functions for each of the
cycles.
The properties of optimal disinvestment behavior whenever a market can go through a
maximum of N ≥ 2 cycles as described above turn out to be quite simple and intuitive.29
First, exit never takes place during a period of market growth (except of course at the ﬁrst
growing phase if the proﬁt level is low enough, which is ruled out to make the analysis
non-trivial).
Second, decline phases of any cycle that is not the Nth one are characterized by an update
of the ﬁrm’s beliefs about the probability that the current downturn will be permanent (in
the spirit of Lemma 1). In particular, as no growth phase arrives, the ﬁrm becomes more
pessimistic about the probability that the market ends up declining forever. Given state π0,
how pessimistic the ﬁrm is depends on the level π at which the market starts its decline,
so the ﬁrm’s optimal disinvestment threshold is a function of π,a sw e l la so ft h en u m b e ro f
t h ec y c l et h r o u g hw h i c ht h em a r k e tm a yg o . 30 For a ﬁxed cycle that is not the Nth one,
cycle n ∈ {1,...,N − 1} say, the optimal exit policy during the decline phase is driven by
Bernanke’s (1983) "bad news principle." In particular, if immediate exit when the market
starts its decline at state π is not optimal, then the ﬁrm must equate the marginal cost
of waiting to disinvest and the marginal value of delaying exit. Let us denote the optimal
level at which the ﬁrm prefers exiting by π∗
n(π) i ft h em a r k e ts t a r t e di t sd e c l i n ep h a s ea t
π.T h e n t h e ﬁrm forgoes rSdt over a short time interval, but gains a ﬂow of proﬁts equal
to π∗
ndt. Yet, deferring exit is valuable as well because there is a marginal option value of
waiting to disinvest, which arises due to the possible arrival of bad news. Thus, if the ﬁrm
29The formal arguments that give rise to the explanations that follow can be found in the proof of Propo-
sition 4 below.
30Of course, the optimal investment threshold in cycle N does not depend on the starting level and rather
is a constant. However, if N is large enough the probability of reaching such a cycle becomes negligible, and
we do not have to care about such "pathological" disinvestment behavior.
18delays disinvestment for a short time interval, then the ﬁrm believes that a growth phase
might start with some probability,31 and the ﬁrm would avoid making a poor exit decision,
since not exiting when an upturn arrives can be shown to yield an asset value greater than
S. Based on the ﬁrm’s updated information, the probability attributed to the arrival of a
growth phase over a short time interval given that it has not yet arrived is p(π∗
n|π)λ2dt.
Assuming that exit is not optimal at the initial date, and letting V
∗
n(π0) denote the value
of the disinvestment opportunity if the market is at state π0 i nt h eg r o w i n gp h a s eo fc y c l e
n ∈ {1,...,N},w ec a nf o r m a l i z et h ep r e v i o u sa r g u m e n t sa sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 4 There exists a unique optimal disinvestment policy, and it is such that the
ﬁrm exits only if the market is declining. In addition, if the market is in the declining phase
of cycle n ∈ {1,..,N − 1} at state π0 and the decline has started at state π ≥ π0, then there
exists a unique b πn <r Ssuch that the threshold π∗
n(π) below which exit is optimal satisﬁes
π∗









n(π)) − S] (4)
for π>b πn. It holds that V
∗
n+1 (π∗
n(π)) >Sfor all π>b πn and that π∗
n(π) is an increasing
function that approaches rS as π →∞ . As for the optimal exit threshold in the declining
phase of cycle N,i ti se q u a lt oπ∗
N =m a x ( rS,π).
Proof. See Appendix B.
A few comments about this set of results are in order. First, b πn is the highest state below
which the ﬁrm prefers exiting immediately if the market suddenly switches from growth to
decline in cycle n ∈ {1,...,N −1} (if such cycle is ever reached, of course). Second, for states
π>b πn at which the market starts declining, the ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it optimal to disinvest
right away after the switching date, and it waits to exit so as to gather information and
shield against making a poor disinvestment decision if the market switches back to growth.
As can be seen from expression (4), optimal decision-making balances the interest lost on
the asset’s outside value against the ﬂow of proﬁts that can be harvested by remaining a
l i t t l eb i tl o n g e ri nt h em a r k e ta n dt h em a r g i n a lc h a n g ei nt h eo p t i o nv a l u eo fw a i t i n gt o
disinvest. This marginal option value stems from the bad news principle of irreversible
investment, as we already explained. Furthermore, when computing the marginal option
value of delaying exit, the ﬁrm takes into account what it learns about the probability of the
market experiencing another growth phase based on the information gathered as time goes
by. Proposition 4 shows that the higher the state at which the market starts its decline, the
31Note that the beginning of a growth phase constitutes bad news for an exit decision in a declining market.
19higher the threshold that optimally triggers exit, which is quite natural given that the ﬁrm
starts becoming pessimistic earlier. Third and last, the proof of Proposition 4 uses induction
and provides the algorithm for computing the optimal exit policy and the value function for
arbitrary N ≥ 2 (no matter how large N is).
As an illustration of Proposition 4, suppose that N =3 , S =1 , r =0 .1, α1 =0 .05 = −α2,
λ1 = λ2 =0 .1 and p0 =0 .8. Then it holds that π∗
3(π)=m i n ( 0 .1,π) (where π is the state at
which the market starts declining in the last cycle). In addition, we have that π∗
2(π)=π if
π ≤ 0.0894,w h e r e a sf o rπ>0.0894, π∗


















+0 .5+5 5 5 .556(π∗
2)
4.I nt u r n ,π∗
1(π)=π if π ≤ 0.0881;e l s e ,π∗
1(π) is








2,w h e r eV
∗
2(·) is
deﬁn e di nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 32 Figure 5 plots the three exit thresholds as a function
of the state at which the market starts declining (the solid curve represents π∗
1 (·),w h e r e a s
the dashed and dotted curves represent π∗
2 (·) and π∗
3 (·), respectively). As shown in the
proposition, π∗
1 (π) and π∗
2 (π) are increasing and converge to 0.1 as π grows large. Also,
π∗
1 (π) <π ∗
2 (π) for π>0.0881,s i n c et h eﬁrm ﬁnds the outside option more tempting when
fewer cycles are left (i.e., the ﬁrm becomes less patient).
Figure 5: Optimal exit thresholds as a function of π when N =3 , S =1 , r =0 .1, α1 =0 .05 = −α2,
λ1 = λ2 =0 .1 and p0 =0 .8
32We omit the expression for V
∗
2(·) because it requires including that for V
∗
2 (·) because of the recursive
structure of the problem.
20We now plot a sample path of the process and analyze how the value of the disinvestment
opportunity (denoted by V (t)) evolves based on that sample path. As can be seen in Figure
6, the switching dates in the sample path (see top of the ﬁgure) are T1 =1 1 .20, T2 =1 6 .48,
T3 =2 2 .15, T4 =4 7 .06 and T5 =5 6 .90 because the realized number of cycles is 3.N o t et h a t
w h e nt h em a r k e ti sg o i n gt h r o u g hi t sﬁr s tc y c l e ,w eh a v et h a tt h ed e c l i n i n gp h a s es t a r t sa t
0.1e0.05(11.20) =0 .1750,s ot h eﬁrm should have exited at state π∗
1(0.1750) = 0.091 if it had
been reached. However, the process starts growing again at state 0.1750e−0.05(16.48−11.20) =
0.1344,s ot h eﬁrm prefers waiting at least until the next declining phase. When the process
starts declining again at state 0.1344e0.05(22.15−16.48) =0 .1784,t h eﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to
wait to exit until state π∗
2(0.1784) = 0.092. Because the sample path reaches such state in the
declining phase of the second cycle, the ﬁrm exits at π∗
2(0.1784),t h a ti s ,a tt i m eTX =3 5 .40.
The bottom of the ﬁgure shows the sample path of the value of the disinvestment opportunity,
which is characterized by upward (downward) jumps whenever a growth phase begins (stops),
unless the ﬁrm chooses to remain inactive.
Figure 6: Sample path of Π(t) and induced sample path of V (t) when N =3 , S =1 , r =0 .1,
α1 =0 .05 = −α2, λ1 = λ2 =0 .1 and p0 =0 .8
Despite it can be seen from this numerical example that the value of the disinvestment
opportunity experiences jumps upwards (downwards) whenever an upturn (downturn) starts,
it has proven intractable when trying to show it analytically. However, this conclusion (and
several others) can be easily drawn with the aid of the mathematical results in Section 3 in
21the relevant case in which p0 =1(and N = ∞) .I nt h i sc a s e ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a te x i tt a k e s
place only if the market is declining,33 so the homogeneity of the (Markov) stochastic process
implies that the ﬁrm simply chooses a threshold πX such that the ﬁrm exits the market the



















Thus, starting from a level π0 at which the market is declining, the ﬁrm collects a dis-
counted stream of proﬁts until state πX <π 0 is ﬁrst reached (from above). The value






, as shown by Theorem 4 for the case in which p0 =1(since
in such a case φ =1 ). However, there is an additional source of value, since the ﬁrm seizes
the outside option, whose value is S, when state πX is ﬁrst reached. The proper expected
discount factor, given that the market is in a decline phase, is ϕ
2(π0,πX |π0)=( π0/πX)
β2,
as shown by Theorem 3 (for p0 =1 ).
Since p0 =1implies that ρ2(π0,π0) does not actually depend on π0, we can drop its












it is easy to prove the following results:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the market is declining and that the ﬁrm is currently active.









33The argument is identical in spirit to the one used for entry, and it makes use of the fact that r>
β2
(β2 − 1)ρ2
, which is shown in the proof of Proposition 7.
22where β2 =




< 0. The value of the ﬁrm is
V
∗













if π0 ≥ π∗
X
S if π0 <π ∗
X
.
Similarly to the canonical real options literature, Proposition 5 implies that the ﬁrm exits
when the expected net present value of its disinvestment falls below S/(β2 − 1) < 0,s i n c e
there exists an opportunity cost for exercising the option to disinvest. As with the entry
problem, the value of the option to disinvest conditional upon the market being in a decline
phase is quite similar to that derived in a Geometric Brownian Motion setting. The same
applies to the optimal disinvestment threshold.
As usual, the ﬁrm’s optimal exit rule lends itself to a marginal interpretation linked to
the "bad news principle":
Proposition 6 The optimal disinvestment threshold π∗
X satisﬁes the following equation:
rS = π
∗
X + λ2 (γ1π
∗
X + δ1S − S). (6)
Proof. See Appendix B.
When deciding whether or not to exit the market, the ﬁrm must compare the marginal
v a l u ea n dt h em a r g i n a lc o s to fw a i t i n g . B yd e l a y i n ge x i tas h o r tt i m ep e r i o do fl e n g t hdt,
the ﬁrm forgoes earning (approximately) rSdt. As usual, the marginal value of waiting to
disinvest consists of two components. Delaying exit a little bit allows the ﬁrm to reap a
ﬂow of proﬁts equal to π∗
Xdt. There is also a marginal option value of waiting to disinvest,
which of course stems from avoiding making a poor disinvestment decision. With conditional
probability λ2dt, the market switches to growth, so waiting would allow the ﬁrm to remain
i no p e r a t i o na n dk e e pt h eo p t i o nt oe x i ti nt h ef u t u r ea l i v e ,w h i c hi sw o r t hγ1π∗
X + δ1S,a t
the expense of sacriﬁcing S.34
To conclude this section, we show that the value of a disinvestment opportunity experi-
ences an upward (downward) jump if a declining phase ends (begins). Our next proposition
establishes this result, which is conceptually very diﬀerent from Proposition 1. Thus, while
t h ej u m pi nt h eﬁrm’s value for a potential entrant is simply due to the discount factor re-
34Note from Corollary 2 that γ1π∗
X quantiﬁes the expected stream of discounted proﬁts while the market
transitions from a state π∗
X in which the market is growing until such state is ﬁrst hit from above. In turn,
note from Corollary 1 that δ1S quantiﬁes the expected discounted value of getting an asset worth S when
the market ﬁrst reaches state π∗
X from above, given that the market is currently at a growing phase whose
state is π∗
X.
23lated to the delay in entry caused by a regime shift, the abrupt change of value for an active
ﬁrm is the result of a trade-oﬀ between the expected stream of discounted proﬁts reaped
and the delayed recovery of the outside value. More speciﬁcally, if the market is declining at
π0 >π ∗
X,t h eﬁrm has a value equal to V
∗
X (π0). However, if the market switches to growth




X (π0), because the ﬁrm
never exits a growing market and hence must wait at least until the proﬁt ﬂow comes back
to the same state. The ﬁrst term, γ1π0, denotes the expected stream of discounted proﬁts
collected while the market moves from state π0 until it ﬁrst comes back to π0 from above (see
Corollary 2). The second term, δ1V
∗
X (π0), denotes the expected continuation value after the
market declines back to state π0 (see Corollary 1). By comparing V
∗
X (π0) and V
∗
X (π0),w e
have the following result:






Proof. See Appendix B.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has modeled the stochastic evolution of demand for high-tech goods by means of
a regime-switching stochastic process in which the regime shifts a random number of times.
We have studied a ﬁrm’s optimal (dis)investment behavior in this type of markets under the
assumption that the realized number of regime switches is never observed. This creates a
signal extraction problem because the ﬁrm can update its beliefs about the probability that
the regime does not experience any additional shifts based on the length of the period during
which the regime does not switch. Given this setting in which ﬂow proﬁt alternates between
growth and decline phases at random times, we have shown that the existence of regime shifts
gives rise to an option value of waiting to (dis)invest and to discontinuities in the sample
path of ﬁrm value. Thus, even though the sample path of proﬁts is continuous, ﬁrm value
experiences jumps upwards (downwards) whenever a growth (decline) phase starts. This
holds regardless of whether the ﬁrm has an option to invest or an option to disinvest. Lastly,
we have provided a marginal interpretation to optimal entry/exit rules in the light of the
bad news principle of irreversible investment, thus providing a strong conceptual foundation
to the theory of real options.
There are at least a couple of aspects that are worthwhile emphasizing about our frame-
work and that may prove to be useful for future work on the properties of irreversible
24(dis)investment in stochastically cyclical markets. On the one hand, we would like to re-
mark that our setting does not require making use of the heavy mathematical apparatus
traditionally employed by the real options literature. For instance, direct applications of
our theorems when there is no signal extraction problem allow us to avoid using stochastic
calculus and even dynamic programming techniques when solving (dis)investment models
that involve lumpiness. As we have shown, (dis)investment timing problems can be directly
formulated and solved using ordinary calculus and are amenable to an economic interpreta-
tion. Indeed, if reentry is not allowed, it is straightforward to solve analytically the problem
faced by a single ﬁrm that must choose when to enter and when to exit. The case in which
there is a signal extraction problem is typically more complex from an analytical standpoint,
and may require using numerical methods when solving it (e.g., in the case of exit). Still,
we believe this is an important feature of the dynamics of product markets such as those
for high-tech goods. Because such markets are usually oligopolistic, it would be interesting
to analyze the dynamics of competition among several ﬁrms with private information about
the prior probability that the current cycle is the last one. For the case of disinvestment,
we conjecture that ﬁrms would play a war of attrition in which the winner would face a
"survivor’s curse" (see Moscarini and Squintani 2004).
Another aspect worthwhile pointing out is that the model can be enriched in order to
improve its explanatory power, possibly at the expense of analytical tractability. Thus, when
a switching date is realized, the sample path of the process that governs proﬁt evolution is
assumed to change to a diﬀerent but known growth rate. Assuming that the growth rate is
random may lead to possibly diﬀerent (dis)investment dynamics given a market evolution
that need not be stochastically cyclical despite the regime shifts. This may prove fruitful
for the construction of random processes that better represent the stochastic dynamics of a
variety of economic and ﬁnancial variables. Both theoretical and empirical work may beneﬁt
from pursuing this promising research avenue.
25Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. By Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability that the current decline
p h a s ei sn o tt h el a s to n eg i v e nt h a tt h ep e r i o do ft i m ee l a p s e db e t w e e nπ and π0 is t(π0,π)=
1
α2
ln(π0/π) equals p(π0 |π)=
e−λ2t(π0,π)p0
e−λ2t(π0,π)p0 +1− p0







α2 +( 1− p0)
. That the posterior belief increases with π0 can be seen
by inspection.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Let E(π0,0) denote the expected stream of discounted proﬁts when
the process is growing at π0. Also, let E(π0,0|π) denote the expected stream of discounted
proﬁts when the process started declining at π and the current level of the process is π0
(the expectation is conditional upon the information gathered during the transition between






























−rsds + E (π0e
α2τ2,0)e
−rτ2]dτ2.
To see how E(π0,0) arises, note that the process will start declining at some random
future date τ1,s ot h eﬁrm gets a stream of discounted proﬁts until the switching date,
together with an asset worth E(π0eα1τ1,0|π0eα1τ1)e−rτ1.R e g a r d i n g E(π0,0|π),n o t et h a t
with updated probability 1−p(π0 |π) the process will never grow again, and hence the ﬁrm
collects a discounted proﬁt stream given that the process declines forever. With probability
p(π0 |π), though, the process will expand at some random future date τ2,s ot h eﬁrm collects
ad i s c o u n t e dp r o ﬁt stream until the process stops declining, and the discounted value of an
asset worth E(π0eα2τ2,0) at such switching date.
Because p(π0 |π0)=p0 and E (π0eα2τ2,0) = eα2τ2E (π0,0) (since random variables are
independent), some simple manipulations in (8) imply that
E(π0,0|π0)=
[r − α2 +( 1− p0)λ2]π0
(r − α2)(r + λ2 − α2)
+
p0λ2E (π0,0)
r + λ2 − α2
.




[r − α2 +( 1− p0)λ2]π0eα1τ1
(r − α2)(r + λ2 − α2)
+
p0λ2E(π0eα1τ1,0)





(r − α2)(r + λ1 + λ2 − α2)+λ1λ2(1 − p0)
(r − α2)[(r + λ2 − α2)(r + λ1 − α1) − p0λ2λ1]
¸
π0.
Hence, E (π0,0) = ρ1π0,a sw ec l a i m e d .
As for the functional form of E(π0,0|π), performing some manipulations in (8) using
that E (π0eα2τ2,0) = ρ1π0eα2τ2 and that
[(r − α2)ρ1 − 1]λ2
(r + λ2 − α2)
=
λ2(α1 − α2)







[(r − α2)ρ1 − 1]λ2p(π0 |π)





To complete the proof, notice that the inequality in (1) holds by assumption and just make
use of the fact that 0 <ρ 2(π0,π) ≤ ρ2(π0,π 0) <ρ 1.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Let ϕ1(π0,π ∗) denote the expected discounted value of a claim
to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π∗ from below, conditional on the process being in a
growth phase and on its state being π0 <π ∗.A l s o , l e t ϕ
1(π0,π∗ |π) denote the expected
discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π∗ from below, conditional
on the process being in a decline phase that started at level π a n do nt h ec u r r e n ts t a t e
being π0 ≤ π.B yd e ﬁnition, the following holds given our (memoryless) assumptions on the

































−rτ2dτ2.( 1 0 )
27To understand the relation between ϕ1(π0,π∗) and ϕ
1(π0,π∗ |π), note that if the realized






) (the time it would take to hit state
π∗ from below during the current growth phase), then the ﬁrm would acquire an asset whose
discounted value would be ϕ







then the ﬁrm would acquire the discounted value of a dollar. As for ϕ
1(π0,π∗ |π),n o t et h a t
with updated probability 1−p(π0 |π) the process will permanently decline and hence it will
never hit state π∗ from below, whereas with complementary probability the process will start
growing at some random future date τ2, and hence the ﬁrm will acquire at such date an asset
whose discounted value is ϕ1(π0eα2τ2,π∗)e−rτ2.





(where Y and θ1 are constants to be found out), and use such
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Therefore, Y =1 ,w h e r e a sθ1 must satisfy the following equation:
(r + λ2 − α2θ1)(r + λ1 − α1θ1)=p0λ1λ2.( 1 2 )
There exist two values of θ1 that solve this quadratic equation. One of the roots, β1 say, can
be easily shown to be greater than 1 (since λ1(r+λ2(1−p0)−α2)+(r+λ2−α2)(r−α1) > 0),
28whereas the other one, β2 say, is negative (since (r+λ2−α2)(r+λ1−α1) >p 0λ1λ2). Clearly,
only β1 can be an admissible solution, so recalling that
∆ =[ α1 (λ2 + r) − α2 (λ1 + r)]
2 +4 p0α1α2λ1λ2
yields that
θ1 = β1 ≡





























r + λ2 − α2β1 =





[α1(r + λ2) − α2(r + λ1)]2 − ∆
2α1[α1(r + λ2) − α2(r + λ1) −
√
∆]
and [α1 (λ2 + r) − α2 (λ1 + r)]2 − ∆ = −4p0α1α2λ1λ2. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . Let ϕ2(π0,π ∗) denote the expected discounted value of a claim
to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π∗ from above, conditional on the process being in a
growth phase and on the current state being π0 ≥ π∗. In addition, let ϕ
2(π0,π∗ |π) denote
the expected discounted value of a claim to a dollar when the process ﬁrst hits π∗ from
above, conditional on the process being in a decline phase that started at level π and on the



































To understand the relation between ϕ2(π0,π ∗) and ϕ
2(π0,π∗ |π), note that if the process is
going through a growth phase at π0,t h e ns t a t eπ∗ ≤ π0 will never be hit in such a phase.
29Hence, when a switching date is realized at τ1,t h eﬁrm will get ϕ
2(π0eα1τ1,π∗ |π0eα1τ1)e−rτ1.
However, if the process is going through a declining phase at π0, and such phase has started
at π ≥ π0, then with updated probability 1 − p(π0 |π) the process hits level π∗ <π 0 for
sure and hence the ﬁrm gets the properly discounted value of a dollar. With complementary
probability p(π0 |π), the process will grow at some random future date τ2, so two situations
must be distinguished. On the one hand, if the process starts declining before reaching π∗
at the random date τ2, then the ﬁrm will attain ϕ2(π0eα2τ2,π∗)e−rτ2. On the other hand, if
the declining process goes all the way down to π∗,t h e nt h eﬁrm will attain the discounted
value of the dollar when state π∗ is hit for the ﬁrst time.








α2 (where A, C,a n dθ2 are constants to











































































λ2 (1 − A)+r − α2θ2







































λ1 (1 − p0 + Cp0)














λ2 (1 − A)+r − α2θ2








r + λ1 − α1
α2 (λ2 + r)
!








α2,w em u s th a v et h a tt h e
following three equations hold:
λ1 (1 − p0 + Cp0)
λ1 + r(1 − α1
α2)
= C,( 1 4 )
30λ1λ2Ap0
(r + λ2 − α2θ2)(r + λ1 − α1θ2)
= A,( 1 5 )
and
λ2 (1 − A)+r − α2θ2
λ2 + r − α2θ2
− C =0 .( 1 6 )
Using expression (14) yields that
C =
λ1 (1 − p0)
λ1 (1 − p0)+r(1 − α1
α2)
.( 1 7 )
In turn, equation (15) implies that θ2 solves
(λ2 + r − α2θ2)(λ1 + r − α1θ2)=p0λ1λ2.
We have shown before (see (12)) that the roots of this quadratic equation are β1 > 1 and
β2 < 0. Only the negative root can be admissible now, so
θ2 = β2 ≡





In addition, equations (16) and (17) with θ2 = β2 imply that
A =
r(1 − α1
α2)(r + λ2 − α2β2)
λ2[λ1 (1 − p0)+r(1 −
α1
α2)]
.( 1 8 )
Therefore, recalling that φ =
r(α1 − α2)





r(α1 − α2) − λ1α2 (1 − p0)
µ


































31Note that using the deﬁnitions of φ and β2 implies that
δ1 =1 − φ +







2α1λ2 ] − λ1α2 (1 − p0)
r(α1 − α2) − λ1α2 (1 − p0)
∈ (0,1).













P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . Let E(π0,π ∗) denote the expected value of the stream of discounted
proﬁts collected while the process transitions from π0 until it ﬁrst hits π∗ from above, condi-
tional on the process being in a growth phase and on the current state being π0 ≥ π∗.A l s o ,
let E(π0,π∗ |π) be the expected stream of discounted proﬁts collected while the process tran-
sitions from π0 until it ﬁrst hits π∗ from above, conditional on the process being in a decline














































To see how E(π0,π∗) arises, note that the process will start declining at some random future
date τ1,s ot h eﬁrm gets a stream of discounted proﬁts since the current date until then, and
also the discounted value of an asset worth E(π0eα1τ1,π∗ |π0eα1τ1).A s f o r E(π0,π∗ |π),w e
have that with updated probability 1−p(π0 |π) the process never grows again, and hence it
hits π∗ from above for sure; in the meantime, the ﬁrm collects a stream of proﬁts that has
to be properly discounted. With complementary probability p(π0 |π), the process grows at
some random future date τ2, although it may start growing before hitting π∗ (from above).
32If it does not, then the ﬁrm reaps a stream of discounted proﬁts until π∗ i sh i ta tt i m e
ln(π∗/π0)
α2
. If the process starts growing before hitting π∗, then the ﬁrm reaps a discounted
proﬁt stream until the process stops declining, and the discounted value of an asset worth
E(π0eα2τ2,π ∗) at such switching date.
Let us suppose that E(π0,π∗)=E (π0)
θ6 + F (π0)
θ7 + G(π0)
θ8 (where θ6, θ7 and θ8 are
constants, whereas E, F and G do not depend on π0 although they may depend on π∗), so
that letting p = p(π0 |π), plugging the assumed functional form of E(π0,π ∗) into (20) and
performing several manipulations yields:
E(π0,π
∗ |π)=

























































































































Substitute this into (19) taking into account that p(π0eα1τ1 |π0eα1τ1)=p0 so as to get the









r + λ2 − α2
¶
π0






































(r − α2)(α2(r + λ1) − rα1)
+
p0λ2E(π0)θ6λ1
(r + λ2 − α2θ6)(r + λ1 − α1θ6)
+
p0λ2F(π0)θ7λ1
(r + λ2 − α2θ7)(r + λ1 − α1θ7)
+
p0λ2G(π0)θ8λ1
(r + λ2 − α2θ8)(r + λ1 − α1θ8)
.
Assume that θ6 =1and θ7 =
r
α2




θ8 implies that the following must hold:
E =
(r + λ2 − α2)(r + λ1 − α2) − p0λ1λ2
(r − α2)((r + λ2 − α2)(r + λ1 − α1) − p0λ1λ2)
= ρ1,( 2 1 )
F =




(r − α2)[r(α1 − α2) − λ1α2(1 − p0)]
,( 2 2 )
G = −









,( 2 3 )
and
(r + λ2 − α2θ8)(r + λ1 − α1θ8)=p0λ1λ2.
We must clearly have that θ8 = β2 < 0, so using this result as well as expressions (21), (22)




















































r + λ2 − α2β2
= ρ2(π0, ¯ π)π0 − [
r(α1 − α2)(1 − p) − λ1α2(1 − p0)



















= ρ2(π0, ¯ π)π0 −
µ
r(α1 − α2)(1 − p) − λ1α2(1 − p0)































r(α1 − α2)(1 − p) − λ1α2(1 − p0)































r + λ2 − α2β2
=0 ,
the third equality uses
1+λ2ρ1






(r − α2)[(r + λ2 − α2)(r + λ1 − α1) − p0λ1λ2]
and the last equality follows because
λ2 (α1 − α2)p
(r − α2)[(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) − p0λ1λ2]
= ρ2(π0, ¯ π) −
1
r − α2
.( 2 4 )
35As a result, the desired expression for E(π0,π∗ |π) f o l l o w sb ys i m p l yu s i n g
φ =
r(α1 − α2)
r(α1 − α2) − λ1α2 (1 − p0)
.
In turn, note that
E(π0,π








































where the last equality makes use of the deﬁnition of δ1.
Appendix B
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
Let π∗
E denote the threshold that triggers investment when the process is above or at
such state for the ﬁr s tt i m eg i v e nt h a tt h em a r k e ti sg r o w i n g . I na d d i t i o n ,l e tπ∗
E denote
t h et h r e s h o l dt h a tt r i g g e r si n v e s t m e n tw h e nt h ep r o c e s si sa b o v eo ra ts u c hs t a t ef o rt h e
ﬁr s tt i m eg i v e nt h a tt h em a r k e ti sd e c l i n i n g .W ec l a i mt h a tπ∗
E ≥ π∗
E,35 so suppose to the
contrary that π∗
E < π∗
E, and consider states such that the ﬁrm does not invest immediately
if the market is in growth, but such that the arrival of the next switching date would trigger
immediate investment: formally, π0 ∈ [π∗
E,π∗
E). In this case, the dynamics of the value of
the investment opportunity while the market is growing, denoted by V
∗
E(π0),a r eg i v e nb y
the following Bellman equation:
V
∗
E(π0)=m a x {ρ1π0−K,(1−rdt)[λ1dt(ρ2(π0+α1π0dt)−K)+(1−λ1dt)V
∗
E(π0+α1π0dt)]}.
On the waiting region, a Taylor expansion and straightforward manipulations ignoring terms
35Note that this implies that the ﬁrm invests only if the market is growing owing to the continuous sample
path of the stochastic process.








+ λ1(ρ2π0 − K).











α1 ,( 2 5 )




E − K, whence one can




























Using the fact that




E) with respect to π∗
E yields that π∗




is strictly quasi-concave). As a result, we have that the value of an optimally managed

















α1 .( 2 7 )
Once the value of π∗
E has been found out, it simply remains to ﬁnd out that of π∗
E.T ot h i s




E(π0) denote the value of the investment opportunity if the market is declining, and
note that the dynamics of V
∗










E(π0),( 2 8 )
since the ﬁrm is in the waiting region during the decline phase. Similarly, V
∗
E(π0) satisﬁes











E (π0),( 2 9 )
since the ﬁrm does not invest right away if the market switches from growth to decline. Solv-
ing the system of diﬀerential equations comprised by (28) and (29), and using the boundary
37condition that V
∗




β1,( 3 0 )
where R is a constant to found out, and β1 =





(27) at π0 = π∗
















































.( 3 1 )
Performing some manipulations, we have that the derivative of V
∗
E(π0 |π∗













r + λ1 − α1
+
rK(r + λ1 − α1β1)

















































r + λ1 − α1
+
rK(r + λ1 − α1β1)
































=0 ,t h eﬁrst inequality holds because
38ρ2 <ρ 1 <
β1
r(β1 − 1)
,36 and the last inequality follows since π∗
















λ1ρ2(1 − β1)(r + λ1)rK
(r + λ1)(r + λ1 − α1)
+
rK(r + λ1 − α1β1)
(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ1)
+
β1λ1(r + λ1 − α1)K







[(1 − β1)rρ1 + β1]K(π0)β1
(π∗
E)β1+1 > 0,
since λ1ρ2 =( λ1 + r − α1)ρ1 − 1 by expression (26) and ρ1 <
β1
r(β1 − 1)
was just shown to
a l w a y sh o l d .T h i sp r o v e st h a tV
∗
E(π0 |π∗
E) is an increasing function for π∗
E <r K ,a n d( 3 1 )





















which is the (expected) payoﬀ if the ﬁrm does not invest during the market decline and it
invests the ﬁrst time the market reaches state rK, conditional upon the current state being
36To show that ρ1 <
β1
r(β1 − 1)
,n o t et h a t
(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) − p0λ1λ2 = α1α2 (1 − β1)(1− β2),
so some algebraic manipulations yield that ρ1 can be rewritten as follows:
ρ1 =
(r − α2)(r + λ1 + λ2 − α2)+( 1− p0)λ1λ2





r(r + λ1 + λ2)+( 1− p0)λ1λ2 − rα2
α1α2 (1 − β1)(1− β2)
+
(1 − p0)λ1λ2








(1 − β1)(1− β2)
+
(1 − p0)λ1λ2
α1 (r − α2)(1− β1)(1− β2)
],
where the last equality makes use of the fact that α1α2β1β2 = r(r + λ1 + λ2)+( 1− p0)λ1λ2.A sar e s u l t ,
it follows that
(β1 − 1)ρ1r − β1
ρ1 (β1 − 1)
=
β1β2 − r
α1 − β1 (β2 − 1)
ρ1 (β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
+
(1 − p0)λ1λ2
α1ρ1(r − α2)(β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
<
α1β1 − r
α1ρ1 (β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
< 0,




39π0 <r K. As we show below (see Proposition 1), the ﬁrm’s maximal payoﬀ conditional upon
investing only if the market is growing is max
πE
(ρ1πE − K)(π0/πE)
β1.T h ef a c tt h a t
V
∗











contradicts the optimality of investing during the market decline, which concludes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Note that expression (2) holds if and only if
ρ1(α1β1 − α1)π
∗
E = α1β1K (32)
is satisﬁed. Because we have that α1β1 = λ1 (1 − δ2)+r, condition (32) is equivalent to
(r − α1)ρ1π
∗
E = rK + λ1 (1 − δ2)(K − ρ1π
∗
E).
It is simple to show that it holds that (r − α1)ρ1 =1+λ1 (ρ2 − ρ1),s op l u g g i n gt h i se q u a l -




E = rK + λ1[δ2(ρ1π
∗
E − K) − (ρ2π
∗
E − K)].
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . We solve the ﬁrm’s dynamic optimization problem by working
backwards. If the declining phase of cycle N is ever reached, then the ﬁr mk n o w st h a tt h e r e
will be no growth phase in the future. Letting π0 be the proﬁt level that an active ﬁrm
makes at the current date, and denoting the level at which it chooses to exit by πN,w eh a v e
















Hence, the ﬁrm earns a discounted proﬁt stream in a contracting market until level πN is ﬁrst
hit; at such date, the ﬁrm exits irreversibly and seizes the discounted value of the outside
option.
Accounting for corner solutions, it is simple to show that the optimal disinvestment rule
calls for exiting the ﬁr s tt i m et h ep r o c e s si sb e l o wl e v e lπ∗
N ≡ min(rS,π0). Hence, letting
V
∗
N(π0) ≡ V N(π∗
N|π0) denote the value of an optimally managed disinvestment opportunity
















α2 if π0 >r S
S if π0 ≤ rS
.( 3 3 )
Suppose now that the growing phase of cycle N i sr e a c h e dw i t ht h eﬁrm active in the
market. Let π0 denote the current market state, and denote the exit threshold in the last





































Therefore, if the market stops growing at the random time τ1 ∈ (0,
1
α1
ln(πN/π0)),t h e nt h e
ﬁrm collects a discounted proﬁt stream until time τ1, and attains the discounted value of a
disinvestment opportunity in a declining market at level π0eα1τ1. If the market stops growing
at some τ1 ≥
1
α1
ln(πN/π0),t h e nt h eﬁrm exits at state πN and hence reaps a stream of
discounted proﬁts until such state is ﬁrst reached, and the properly discounted value of the
outside option.





πN − rS + λ1(V
∗








Therefore, using (33) implies that sign(
∂V N(πN|π0)
∂πN
)=sign(πN − rS), and hence the
unique value of πN such that ∂V N(πN|π0)/∂πN =0is πN = rS. Using the diﬀerentiability
of V
∗
N (π0),i ti se a s yt os h o wt h a t∂2V N(rS|π0)/∂π2
N =1> 0 (since dV
∗
N (rS)/dπ0 =0 ),
which implies that V N(πN|π0) is strictly quasi-convex. As a result, the ﬁrm must choose at
state π0 whether to exit immediately and seize S or to wait until the market starts decaying









































41It is easy to see that there exists a unique π∗
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(λ1 + r − α2)π0








α2 if π0 >r S
π0













N <π 0 ≤ rS





N(π0) ≡ V N(π∗
N|π0) (and π∗
N satisﬁes V N(∞|π∗
N)=S).
This completes the characterization of the optimal disinvestment policy whenever cycle
N is reached. In the set of cycles N − k (where k is an integer weakly greater than 1), the
optimal disinvestment policy must account for the fact that the ﬁrm is unsure about whether
the decline phase of the cycle is going to be the permanent or not. In the remainder of the
proof, we prove inductively a claim similar to that made in the statement of the proposition,
namely:
Claim 1 For each cycle N − k (with k ≥ 1), there exists a unique optimal disinvestment
policy, and it is such that the ﬁrm exits only if the market is declining. In addition, if the
market is in the declining phase of cycle N − k at state π0 and the decline has started at
state π ≥ π0, then there exists a unique b πN−k <r Ssuch that the threshold π∗
N−k(π) below
which exit is optimal satisﬁes π∗


















for π>b πN−k. It holds that π∗
N−k(π) is an increasing function that approaches rS as π →∞ .





V N−k(∞|π0) if π0 > π∗
N−k











>Sfor all π>b πN−k,w h e r eb πN−k is uniquely
given by b πN−k + p0λ2[V
∗
N−k+1 (b πN−k) − S]=rS.
We start by showing that Claim 1 holds for k =1 . So suppose that the market is in a
declining stage that started at level π, with the current state being π0 ≤ π.L e t t i n g πN−1
be the level at which the ﬁrm would ﬁnd it optimal to exit should the market be declining
b yt h e n ,w ec a nc o m p u t et h eﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ to exiting at πN−1 using the posterior
42belief in Lemma 1:

























































































Hence, the (candidate) maximizer π∗

















− S),( 3 5 )
where π∗
N−1 > π∗







= S, and hence π∗
N−1 = rS > π∗
N ≥ π∗
N−1,
which is a contradiction). This implies that π∗
N <π ∗
N−1 <r S , and therefore the ﬁrm would
never exit if another growth phase started.37















































































> 0 for any π0 > π∗
N imply that the global maximizer of V N−1(πN−1|π0,π) is
37Suppose to the contrary that the ﬁrm found itself in a situation in which it would exit in the next
growth phase. Then the continuity of the process implies that the ﬁrm should have already exited the
market during the previous decline phase, which contradicts the hypothesis that the ﬁrm was active at the
end of the downturn.
43indeed given by (35), at least if the solution to the maximization problem is interior.
Of course, the solution may not be interior and the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to exit
immediately once the market switches to decline. That is, for π0 = π,
∂V N−1(πN−1|π,π)
∂πN−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
πN−1=π
≥ 0 (36)
might hold. This inequality is satisﬁed if and only if
π + p0λ2(V
∗
N (π) − S) ≤ rS.
Because the left hand side is increasing in π, and exceeds rS when π = rS,t h e r ee x i s t sa
unique state b πN−1 <r Ssuch that the inequality holds with equality. Hence, condition (36)
holds if and only if π ≤ b πN−1, which means that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to disinvest right
away whenever the market switches to decline at some level π ≤ b πN−1. Otherwise, the ﬁrm
prefers waiting to disinvest and uses the threshold given by (35). Notice that the optimal
investment threshold is an implicit function of the starting level π, that is, we have that
π∗
N−1(π).H e n c e ,π∗
N−1(π) denotes the level below which the ﬁrm prefers exiting right away
if the market is in the declining phase of the N − 1th cycle. For π ≤ b πN−1, π∗
N−1(π)=π,
whereas π∗
N−1(π) is given by (35) for π>b πN−1. In the latter case, the implicit function















































Hence, the optimal disinvestment threshold increases with π for π ≥ b πN−1,w i t hπ∗
N−1(π) →
rS as π →∞ .
Let V
∗
N−1(π0|π) ≡ V N−1(π∗
N−1(π)|π0,π), and consider the growing stage of cycle N − 1.
As usual, let π0 denote the current state of the market, and denote the threshold at which







































πN−1 − rS + λ1(V
∗








Consider a state πN−1 such that
∂V N−1(πN−1|π0)
∂πN−1
=0holds, and evaluate the second deriv-























≥ 0, it follows that the ﬁrm’s objective function is strictly
quasi-convex, and as a result, the ﬁrm must choose at state π0 whether to exit immediately



















N−1 <r Sbe the unique level such that V N−1(∞|π0)=S holds, and let V
∗
N−1(π0) ≡





V N−1(∞|π0) if π0 > π∗
N−1
S if π0 ≤ π∗
N−1
.
To complete the proof, it only remains to show that the claim is true for k ≥ 2 whenever
it is true for k −1. So suppose that Claim 1 holds for cycle N −k +1, and let us derive the
optimal disinvestment policy for cycle N − k. Although the proof follows verbatim the one
for k =1because of the recursive structure of the problem, we brieﬂy go over each step for
the sake of completeness. As for the declining phase, the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is






















































































− S),( 3 7 )
and it is standard to show that (34) (for the appropriate subscript) implies that π∗
N−k >
π∗
N−k+1. This yields that π∗
N−k+1 <π ∗
N−k <r S , and therefore the ﬁrm will never exit the
market in the growing phase of cycle number N − k +1 .
If the solution is not interior, that is, if for π0 = π
∂V N−k(πN−k|π0,π)
∂πN−k
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
πN−k=π
≥ 0
holds, then we must have that
π + p0λ2(V
∗
N−k+1 (π) − S) ≤ rS.
T h el e f th a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nπ, and exceeds rS when π = rS,s ot h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e
state b πN−k such that the inequality holds with equality. Hence, π∗
N−k(π)=π for π ≤ b πN−k,
while π∗






As for the growth stage, letting V
∗
N−k(π0|π) ≡ V N−k(π∗
N−k(π)|π0,π) yields that the


































This function can be easily shown to be strictly quasi-convex,38 so the ﬁrm must choose at
38Because π∗
N−k(·) has a kink at b πN−k, it is reasonable to think that V
∗
N−k(π0|π0) might not be dif-
ferentiable at π0 = b πN−k,w h i c hw o u l di m p l yt h a tV N−k(πN−k|π0) is not everywhere diﬀerentiable with
46state π0 whether to exit immediately and seize S or to wait until the market starts declining
a n dg a i na ne x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ equal to V N−k(∞|π0).I fπ∗
N−k <r Sdenotes the unique level
for which V N−k(∞|π0)=S holds and we let V
∗






V N−k(∞|π0) if π0 > π∗
N−k
S if π0 ≤ π∗
N−k
.
This shows that Claim 1 holds for cycle N − k, and hence completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Note that equation (5) holds if and only if
π
∗
Xα2ρ2(β2 − 1) − α2β2S =0
is satisﬁed. Adding up rS on both sides of this expression, and using the facts that r−α2β2 =
λ2 (δ1 − 1) (see deﬁnition of δ1 in Theorem 3 for φ =1 )a n d1+λ2γ1 = ρ2[λ2 (1 − δ1)+r−α2]
(so 1+λ2γ1 = α2ρ2(β2 − 1)) leads to the desired result.
















so we simply have to show that r>
β2
ρ2(β2 − 1)
holds. To prove this, notice that
(r + λ1 − α1)(r + λ2 − α2) − λ1λ2 = α1α2 (1 − β1)(1− β2),
respect to πN−k. To clear this doubt, we proceed to show that V
∗
N−k(π0|π0) ≡ V N−k(π∗
N−k|π0,π0) has a
right-derivative at π0 = b πN−k equal to 0 (since the left-derivative is 0). Because
V
∗










































the envelope theorem and the fact that π∗






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
π0↓e πN−k
=( 1− p0)(
rS − b πN−k
α2b πN−k
)+p0(





Since b πN−k + p0λ2(V
∗





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
π0↓e πN−k
=0 , as desired.





r(r + λ1 + λ2) − rα1







(1 − β1)(1− β2)
],
where the last equality follows because it holds that α1α2β1β2 = r(r + λ1 + λ2).A sar e s u l t ,
using the fact that α2β2 − r = λ2 (1 − δ1) (see deﬁnition of δ1 in Theorem 3 if φ =1 ) yields
that




α2 − β2 (β1 − 1)
ρ2(β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
=
λ2 (1 − δ1)
α2ρ2 (β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
,
whence it is clear that
ρ2r(β2 − 1) − β2




> 0,s i n c eδ1 ∈ (0,1), β1 > 1 and
β2 < 0.






X) > 0, and to complete the proof it
suﬃces to show that V
∗
X (π0) − V
∗






X) for π0 >π ∗
X.T op r o v et h a t
V
∗
X (π0) − V
∗
X (π0) is increasing for π0 >π ∗
X,l e tπ0 >π ∗




X (π0) − V
∗




{ρ2[λ2 (1 − δ1)+r − α2] − 1}π0
λ2
− (1 − δ1)V
∗
X (π0)
=( 1 − δ1)(ρ2π0 − V
∗
X (π0)) +
[ρ2 (r − α2) − 1]π0
λ2




















[ρ2 (r − α2) − 1]π0
λ2
,
where the last two equalities follow from Proposition 5. Note from expression (24) for p0 =1
(since p ≡ p(π0|π) equals 1 for p0 =1 )t h a t
ρ2 (r − α2) − 1=
λ2 (α1 − α2)ρ2





















X (π0) − V
∗
X (π0) is clearly increasing in π0 (since δ1 ∈ (0,1) and β2 < 0), which
shows that V
∗
X (π0) − V
∗






X) for π0 >π ∗
X.
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